Population management using gene drive: molecular design, models of spread dynamics and assessment of ecological risks by RODE, Nicolas et al.
HAL Id: hal-02338278
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02338278
Submitted on 26 May 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution| 4.0 International License
Population management using gene drive: molecular
design, models of spread dynamics and assessment of
ecological risks
Nicolas Rode, Arnaud Estoup, Denis Bourguet, Virginie Courtier-Orgogozo,
Florence Débarre
To cite this version:
Nicolas Rode, Arnaud Estoup, Denis Bourguet, Virginie Courtier-Orgogozo, Florence Débarre. Popu-
lation management using gene drive: molecular design, models of spread dynamics and assessment of
ecological risks. Conservation Genetics, Springer Verlag, 2019, 20 (4), pp.671-690. ￿10.1007/s10592-
019-01165-5￿. ￿hal-02338278￿
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Conservation Genetics (2019) 20:671–690 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10592-019-01165-5
REVIEW ARTICLE
Population management using gene drive: molecular design, models 
of spread dynamics and assessment of ecological risks
Nicolas O. Rode1  · Arnaud Estoup1 · Denis Bourguet1 · Virginie Courtier‑Orgogozo2  · Florence Débarre3 
Received: 12 November 2018 / Accepted: 17 February 2019 / Published online: 1 April 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
CRISPR gene drive has recently been proposed as a promising technology for population management, including in con-
servation genetics. The technique would consist in releasing genetically engineered individuals that are designed to rapidly 
propagate a desired mutation or transgene into wild populations. Potential applications in conservation biology include 
the control of invasive pest populations that threaten biodiversity (eradication and suppression drives), or the introduction 
of beneficial mutations in endangered populations (rescue drives). The propagation of a gene drive is affected by different 
factors that depend on the drive construct (e.g. its fitness effect and timing of expression) or on the target species (e.g. its 
mating system and population structure). We review potential applications of the different types of gene drives for conser-
vation. We examine the challenges posed by the evolution of resistance to gene drives and review the various molecular 
and environmental risks associated with gene drives (e.g. propagation to non target populations or species and unintended 
detrimental ecosystem impacts). We provide some guidelines for future gene drive research and discuss ethical, biosafety 
and regulation issues.
Keywords Invasive species · Endangered species · Genetic population management · Conservation genetics · Assisted gene 
flow · Genetic rescue
Introduction
Endangered species and ecosystems can be protected using 
either direct interventions targeting the species of interest, 
or indirect interventions that focus on the surrounding spe-
cies or environment. The potential use of synthetic biol-
ogy technologies, such as gene drives, to meet these goals, 
has recently sparked interest (Piaggio et al. 2017), but also 
concerns (SynBioWatch 2016) among conservation biolo-
gists. Population management using gene drive is based on 
the release of genetically engineered individuals that are 
designed to propagate a desired mutation or transgene in 
natural populations (Fig. 1, Box 1). Depending on the fit-
ness effect of a drive construct, we can distinguish three 
types of gene drives in conservation biology: eradication, 
suppression and rescue drives (Fig. 2). Compared to other 
typologies, for example whether or not the drive confers a 
new function to the organism (e.g. alteration or replacement 
drives; Gantz et al. 2015), we consider that this distinction 
into three categories is the most relevant for conservation 
purposes, as the fitness effect of a drive construct is an 
important parameter for its spread in a target population.
Eradication and suppression drives are designed to extir-
pate or decrease the size of a population, respectively. They 
rely on the introduction of strongly or mildly deleterious 
mutations, respectively. These drives are primarily devel-
oped for their applications for human health and for the 
control of agricultural pests. They could also be applied for 
ecosystem management in conservation, to target invasive 
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species that threaten biodiversity (Esvelt et al. 2014). Using 
gene drive for population management could have lower 
health, economic and environmental costs than traditional 
control methods (Harvey-Samuel et al. 2017).
Rescue drives, on the other hand, could be designed 
to save endangered populations by introducing beneficial 
mutations or removing deleterious ones (Fig.  2; Esvelt 
et al. 2014). Due to the non-Mendelian inheritance of gene 
drives, these mutations would spread more quickly in target 
populations than with natural selection only. Rescue drives 
could alleviate an important dilemma traditionally faced by 
conservation geneticists: should one introduce individuals 
from other regions that bring in useful genetic variability, 
or locally adapted individuals? Introducing individuals from 
a distant source population into an endangered population 
might inadvertently introduce deleterious alleles that could 
result in outbreeding depression or in the overall maladapta-
tion of the population (Bucharova 2017). When only a single 
or a few loci with large fitness effects provide adaptation to 
a specific environmental factor, rescue drives would allow 
locus-specific assisted gene flow, by providing beneficial 
alleles for some adaptive traits, while maintaining alleles for 
other adaptive traits at high frequencies. Rescue drives could 
increase stress tolerance (e.g. using drought-tolerance genes 
in eastern white pine; Tang et al. 2007), or increase resist-
ance to pathogens (e.g. using immunity genes conferring 
Fig. 1  Comparison of Mendelian and gene drive inheritance in mice 
based on conversion rates from Grunwald et al. (2019). a A classical 
mutation is transmitted to 50% of the gametes of heterozygous indi-
viduals (in green; Mendelian inheritance). b A synthetic gene drive 
element, that targets the tyronase (Tyr) gene, is transmitted to 72% of 
the gametes of heterozygous individuals on average (in green; non-
Mendelian inheritance). Gene drive transmission varies from 60 to 
86% when comparing five different crosses of laboratory mice (Grun-
wald et al. 2019). A single pair of chromosomes is presented (black 
rectangle: wild chromosome, green rectangle: chromosome carrying 
a regular mutation or a gene drive). In this example, gene conversion 
takes place in the gonads. Original mouse picture by Donald Hobern-
Flickr. (Color figure online)
Heterozygote
1 wild-type chromosome
1 chromosome with a mutation
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50% wild-type gametes 
50% gametes with a mutation
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blight resistance in American chestnut; Kubisiak et al. 2013; 
Newhouse et al. 2014). Rescue drives could also be used in 
other contexts than conservation. In agriculture, they could 
for instance make honey bees and other important pollina-
tors less susceptible to neonicotinoid insecticides. Regarding 
human health applications, rescue drives could help make 
bank voles more resistant to the tick-borne pathogen Borre-
lia afzelii, which is responsible for Lyme disease in humans 
(e.g. using Toll-like receptors; Tschirren et al. 2013).
Previous reviews on gene drives have focused either on 
the different types of drive systems (e.g. Gantz and Bier 
2016; Champer et al. 2016; Harvey-Samuel et al. 2017; 
Marshall and Akbari 2018), on their applications for human 
health or for pest control in agriculture (e.g. Macias et al. 
2017; Godfray et al. 2017; Scott et al. 2018; McFarlane et al. 
2018) or on the challenges of their development in terms 
of identifying current knowledge gaps (Moro et al. 2018), 
biosafety (Benedict et al. 2018), regulation (Oye et al. 2014; 
Caplan et al. 2015; Meghani and Kuzma 2018) and ethics 
(Courtier-Orgogozo et al. 2017; Thompson 2018). Although 
a number of reviews presented some gene drive applications 
in conservation (Gould 2008; Esvelt et al. 2014; Thresher 
et al. 2014; Webber et al. 2015; Piaggio et al. 2017; Zent-
ner and Wade 2017; Esvelt and Gemmell 2017; Moro et al. 
2018; Min et al. 2018; Dearden et al. 2018; Phelps et al. 
2019; Brossard et al. 2019), the fundamental differences 
between the risks associated with rescue drives and those 
associated with suppression and eradication drives have not 
been considered previously. In this paper, we fill this gap and 
review the use of gene drives for population management 
with a special emphasis on conservation biology. We focus 
on CRISPR-cas9-mediated gene drives (Box 1), a technol-
ogy that can be applied to a wide variety of organisms and is 
more stable than alternative genome editing approaches (i.e. 
less prone to recombination events that result in non-func-
tional enzymes; Champer et al. 2016). Unlike other drive 
systems (e.g. segregation distorters) however, such CRISPR-
based gene drives present important molecular risks. In this 
review, we seek to provide conservation scientists and land 
managers with an in-depth understanding of CRISPR edit-
ing technology, so that they can better assess the risks and 
benefits associated with CRISPR gene drives. For readers 
interested in other drive systems, we recommend other pub-
lications (e.g. Gantz and Bier 2016; Champer et al. 2016; 
Harvey-Samuel et al. 2017; Marshall and Akbari 2018), 
including reviews on t-haplotype gene drives in invasive 
mice (Leitschuh et al. 2018; McFarlane et al. 2018).
Fig. 2  Three different types of gene drives and their potential applications in conservation biology. See main text for details
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Key features affecting gene drive 
propagation
Gene drive timing of expression
The timing of expression of the Cas9 endonuclease and 
gRNA (i.e., timing of conversion) is an important param-
eter for the successful propagation of a gene drive (Fig. 3; 
Deredec et al. 2008). For eradication and suppression drives, 
wild-type/drive heterozygotes have higher fitness than drive 
homozygotes, so that gene conversion late in life (in the 
gonads) favors drive spread more than early gene conversion 
(in the zygote) does (Fig. 3a). Conversely, early conversion 
(in the zygote) favors the spread of rescue drives (Fig. 3b). 
The timing of conversion can be adjusted experimentally by 
using promoters that drive expression at different stages, in 
the germline or in the early zygote (e.g. Champer et al. 2017; 
Hammond et al. 2018).
Box 1  CRISPR-cas9 gene drives: definitions and rates of conversion
By propagating a mutation (or transgene) of interest in a population, gene drives offer the possibility of a new type of transgenesis, no longer 
at the level of the individual, but at the level of the population. This technique is based on the use of synthetic selfish genetic elements 
(Table 1), which, like their natural counterparts, such as homing endonuclease genes, invade populations through the conversion of a wild-
type allele into a gene drive allele. Hence, gene drives bias Mendelian inheritance and can spread a mutation conferring a character of inter-
est in a population, even if this mutation is otherwise deleterious for carrier individuals. The Cas9 enzyme is part of the Clustered Regularly 
Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (hereafter CRISPR) immune system in bacteria, and can target virtually any sequence of DNA (Jinek 
et al. 2012). A CRISPR-cas9 gene drive cassette is a fragment of DNA that comprises different sequences: (i) the cas9 gene, that codes for 
the Cas9 endonuclease enzyme, (ii) a guide RNA (hereafter gRNA) that recognizes a target sequence on the homologous wild-type chromo-
some, (iii) flanking sequences homologous to sequences on both sides of the targeted region and (iv) optionally, a cargo (or “payload”) gene 
that codes for a trait of interest (e.g. malaria resistance).
In a heterozygous individual that carries both a wild-type allele and a CRISPR-cas9 gene drive cassette, there are three different fates for the 
wild-type chromosome. a It can remain intact, for example when the sequence on the wild-type chromosome is different from the sequence 
recognized by the gRNA and not cleaved by Cas9. b The wild-type chromosome can be recognized by the gRNA and cut by Cas9, which 
activates the DNA double-strand break repair machinery. The break can be repaired by homology-directed repair (homologous recombination 
without crossing over) using the chromosome bearing the CRISPR-cas9 gene drive cassette as a template. This process, called homing, rep-
resents a mechanism of biased gene conversion, whereby the gene drive allele is preferentially transmitted to the offspring (Burt and Trivers 
2006). c When the break is not repaired by homology-directed repair, it can be repaired by non-homologous end-joining (NHEJ). Conversion 
rates can vary from 14 to 100% and depend on the organism (Noble et al. 2018), the genetic background (Champer et al. 2017, 2018a), the 
sex of the heterozygous individual (Champer et al. 2018a; Kyrou et al. 2018; Grunwald et al. 2019), the type of construction (one vs. several 
gRNAs; Champer et al. 2018a), the timing of expression (Chan et al. 2011), the location within the genome (Champer et al. 2018a) and likely 
the experimental protocol (Noble et al. 2018).
Wild-type allele
recognition site
guide RNA cargocas9
Cas9-induced double-strand break
indel mutation
No double-strand break
(a) Mendelian transmission (b) Homology-directed repair (c) Non-homologous end-joining (NHEJ) 
repair
1 wild-type allele / 1 gene drive allele 1 gene drive allele / 1 gene drive resistant allele2 gene drive alleles
Gene drive allele
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Fitness: whet = 1 - h s
Fitness: whom = 1 - s
Selection coefficient: s < 0 for rescue drives and s > 0 for eradication and suppression drives
Dominance coefficient: h
(a) conversion in 
the gonads
Fertilization Zygote Adult
Fitness: wWT = 1
Gametes
REPRODUCTION BETWEEN WILD-TYPE INDIVIDUALS
REPRODUCTION BETWEEN WILD-TYPE AND GENE DRIVE INDIVIDUALS WITH : 
(b) conversion in 
the zygote
Fig. 3  Conversion of wild-type allele into a gene drive allele can 
occur either (a) in the adult gonads (i.e. in its germline only) or (b) 
in the zygote. The selection coefficient, s, represents the fitness differ-
ence between wild-type homozygous versus drive homozygous indi-
viduals (s > 0, for eradication and suppression drives, s < 0 for rescue 
drives). When the fitness of wild-type/drive heterozygotes equals the 
fitness of wild-type homozygotes, the gene drive allele is completely 
recessive (dominance coefficient, h = 0), whereas when the fitness 
of wild-type/drive heterozygous equals the fitness of drive homozy-
gous individuals, the gene drive allele is completely dominant (h = 1, 
as represented here). For eradication and suppression drives (s > 0), 
the fitness of heterozygous individuals equals or  is higher than the 
fitness of homozygous individuals  (whet  ≥  whom). For rescue drives 
(s < 0), the fitness of homozygous individuals equals or is higher than 
the fitness of heterozygous individuals  (whom ≥ whet). A single pair of 
chromosomes is presented (black rectangle: wild chromosome, green 
rectangle: chromosome carrying a gene drive). (Color figure online)
Gene drive genetic parameters
Theoretical studies have investigated the influence of differ-
ent parameters on drive dynamics (e.g. Deredec et al. 2008; 
Unckless et al. 2015; Noble et al. 2018). Here we distin-
guish between deterministic models (that assume very large 
population sizes and ignore gene drift) and stochastic models 
(that take chance into account).
In a deterministic model, a gene drive allele can go to 
fixation, disappear, but also reach an intermediate equilib-
rium frequency (see Fig. 4, illustrating results from a model 
where gene conversion takes place in the gonads; see Sup-
plementary Information for model details). For eradication 
or suppression drives, the final state depends on parameters 
such as the probability of successful gene conversion, the 
dominance coefficient (h), and the coefficient of selection 
(s) of the drive allele (Fig. 4). For some parameter com-
binations, the final state also depends on the introduction 
frequency of the drive (“WT or Drive” area in Fig. 4a and 
red curves in Fig. 4b, c). For rescue drives (s < 0), the drive 
allele is predicted to always fix eventually.
These results mostly hold true for stochastic models, but 
the fixation—or loss—of the drive allele is not always guar-
anteed whenever chance events (genetic drift) are taken into 
account. Stochasticity can indeed play an important role for 
small or fragmented populations. It has been confirmed that 
the release of a higher number of drive-carrying individuals 
increases the chance of its eventual fixation (Unckless et al. 
2015).
Theoretical models have exclusively focused on fitness 
differences between gene drive and wild-type alleles dur-
ing the diploid phase of the life cycle, ignoring potential 
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differences also acting during the haploid phase (e.g. in the 
pollen for plants or in males of haplodiploid species such as 
invasive wasps). We expect such fitness differences to favor 
even further the spread of rescue drives, but to disfavor the 
spread of suppression and eradication drives.
Mating systems
Gene drives require sexual reproduction for their trans-
mission. Mate limitation during the establishment phase 
of an invasive species is thought to favor species with 
mixed mating systems (i.e. species that can both outcross 
and self-fertilize or that can reproduce both sexually and 
asexually; Baker 1967; Pannell et al. 2015), compared to 
species that can only outcross or reproduce sexually. Gene 
drives are likely to be less efficient in invasive species with 
such mixed mating systems (Bull 2017). For example, a 
gene drive that targets a species with high rates of selfing 
and low inbreeding depression is unlikely to reach high 
frequencies (Noble et al. 2018). More generally, many of 
the important challenges in conservation genetics involve 
species that reproduce exclusively through selfing or asex-
ual reproduction. For instance, despite the recent discov-
ery of potential candidate genes to mitigate coral bleach-
ing through locus-specific assisted gene flow (Jin et al. 
2016), asexual reproduction of many coral species (e.g. 
Highsmith 1982) or of their endosymbionts (Andras et al. 
2011) represents a major limitation to their management 
using gene drives. Similarly, gene drives cannot be used 
to modify asexually reproducing micro-organisms and 
increase their biodegradation of pollutants (Joutey et al. 
2013) or to modify the asexual cells causing transmissible 
cancer in Tasmanian devils (Siddle et al. 2013).
Generation time
Although gene drives can invade populations in a few doz-
ens of generations, this process could take several centu-
ries in long-lived species. For instance, fixation of a gene 
drive within 20 generations in eastern white pine would 
take about 600 years, considering a generation time of 
30 years (Nijensohn et al. 2005). As climate change occurs 
on a much shorter time scale (Pachauri et al. 2014), it is 
likely that rescue drives could not prevent extinction in 
this particular case.
Population structure in space and time
In spatially-structured populations, dispersal is another 
important parameter to consider to predict gene drive 
propagation. Population fragmentation with low dispersal 
Table 1  Glossary
a We follow the bacterial genetic nomenclature using italicized cas9 for the gene and first-letter capitalised and upright Cas9 for the protein
Synthetic selfish genetic elements Artificial genetic elements that bias Mendelian inheritance during meio-
sis, which favors their transmission to the next generation (Fig. 1)
Gene-drive allele Variant of a gene that can be transmitted to more than 50% of the prog-
eny when present together with a wild-type allele in a heterozygous 
individual (Fig. 1)
Brake allele Variant of a gene that can be transmitted to more than 50% of the prog-
eny when present together with a gene drive allele in a heterozygous 
individual (Fig. 6) but that follows Mendelian inheritance otherwise
cas9a gene Bacterial gene coding for the Cas9 protein, an endonuclease
Guide RNA (gRNA) Engineered ribonucleic acid (RNA) molecule used by Cas9 to recognize 
and target a specific sequence of DNA
Cas9a endonuclease A RNA-guided enzyme that can cut virtually any sequence of DNA that 
matches the sequence of the associated gRNA
CRISPR-cas9 gene drive cassette Fragment of DNA containing the cas9 gene, a gene coding for a gRNA, 
flanking sequences and potentially a cargo gene (Box 1)
Homing endonuclease gene A special class of natural selfish genetic element coding for an enzyme 
capable of cutting a specific DNA sequence, which can result in the 
replacement of the target sequence by the selfish genetic element 
(Box 1)
Homology directed repair (also known as gene conversion) Repair by homologous recombination without crossing-over
Non-homologous end-joining (NHEJ) Pathway to repair DNA double-strand breaks by ligating the two non-
homologous ends. This repair pathway competes with gene conversion 
to repair DNA double-strand breaks (Box 1)
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rates between populations, as often observed in endan-
gered species, would likely affect gene drive dynamics in a 
metapopulation. Very low dispersal rates could slow down 
the spread of a rescue drive in a metapopulation.
Population structure in time, corresponding to the 
presence of resting stages (e.g. seed bank in plants) might 
result in a constant inflow of wild-type individuals for 
years or decades (i.e. dispersal in time rather than space), 
which might reduce the spread of gene drives (NASEM 
2016).
Density‑dependence, age and social structure
Depending on the stage of the life cycle at which they occur, 
the effect of population density on mortality or reproduction 
could also affect gene drive dynamics (Godfray et al. 2017). 
While conversion rates can vary with age (e.g. as observed 
in Drosophila melanogaster; Preston et al. 2006), the influ-
ence of this age factor on drive propagation remains to be 
investigated. Finally, social structures that limit breeding to 
dominant pairs are also likely to affect gene drive spread 
(Moro et al. 2018), although their effect has never been thor-
oughly investigated theoretically.
Potential examples of applications 
in conservation
Population genetics studies have shown that new mutations 
are generally deleterious and that few mutations are advan-
tageous (Eyre-Walker and Keightley 2007). Since the num-
ber of potential genetic targets is smaller for rescue drives 
than for suppression and eradication drives and since our 
knowledge regarding the genetic basis of adaptive traits 
remains limited, rescue drives represent a small fraction of 
potential applications of gene drives in conservation biology. 
We present a list of potential target species (Table 2), and 
provide details regarding four case studies (Fig. 2). Impor-
tantly, these illustrative case studies are hypothetical and are 
unlikely to be developed in the coming years; the reason for 
presenting them is merely to help better assess the different 
types of risks associated with gene drives.
Eradication of invasive black rats in New Zealand
Black rats were introduced to New Zealand following Euro-
pean colonization during the nineteenth century (Atkinson 
1973). Their introduction resulted in the suppression of 
(b)(a)
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Fig. 4  Effect of selection intensity (s) and dominance coefficient (h) 
on drive dynamics for suppression or eradication drives with con-
version in the gonads. s and h are defined as in Fig. 3. a Parameter 
ranges of the different outcomes; “Drive fixation”: fixation of the 
drive allele, “Coex”: coexistence between drive and wild-type (WT) 
alleles, “WT”: fixation of the WT allele, “WT or Drive”: bistabil-
ity, fixation of either the drive or the WT allele, depending on drive 
initial introduction frequency. Rescue drives (s < 0) always fix and 
are not represented. The conversion efficiency c is here set to 85%. 
b Dynamics of the frequency of the drive in the population, for four 
different sets of (s, h) parameters. The parameters corresponding to 
the line colors are shown with colored dots in a. The frequency of 
introduction of the drive allele is 0.1. c Same as (b), but with a higher 
frequency of introduction of the drive allele (0.6). Note the differ-
ent outcome for the red curve (bistability conditions). See Deredec 
et al. (2008) and Supplementary Information for details. (Color figure 
online)
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many endemic plants (through seed predation) and in the 
extinction or decline of several insect, snail, spider, reptile 
and bird species (Towns et al. 2006; Towns 2009).
Different population control methods can be used against 
rats, such as physical removal (e.g. trapping), pesticide treat-
ments (e.g. anticoagulant toxicants), biological control (e.g. 
releasing cat predators) or female sterilization (e.g. contra-
ception; NASEM 2016). In 2016, the New Zealand govern-
ment financed a plan (Predator Free 2050) to eradicate black 
rats along with other invasive species by 2050 (Norton et al. 
2016). Predator Free 2050, together with universities and 
non-profit organizations, is developing an international pro-
gram on gene drive research against rodents (Genetic Bio-
control of Invasive Rodents program; Hall 2017). Thanks to 
the advances of CRISPR-cas9 genome editing in rat (Remy 
et al. 2017), gene drives currently developed in house mice 
(Grunwald et al. 2019) could be tested in rats in the future 
(Fig. 2a; Prowse et al. 2017).
Targeting rats in New Zealand using gene drives could 
have potential unintended consequences. Dispersal of gene 
drive rats to neighbouring countries would be an important 
international issue. Black rats can hybridize with the Asian 
rat, Rattus tanezumi (Chinen et al. 2005), which poses a risk 
of propagation to R. tanezumi native populations. In addi-
tion, removing rats (with any control method) could have 
some negative consequences for native species. For example, 
rats might have replaced native species originally responsi-
ble for dispersing seeds of native plants (Shiels and Drake 
2011) or spores of native fungi (Vernes and McGrath 2009).
Protection of honeycreepers in Hawaii
Honeycreepers and other endemic birds in Hawaii have 
evolved in the absence of avian malaria and, consequently, 
are particularly susceptible to the invasive malaria parasite 
Plasmodium relictum (Lounibos 2002). The main vector of 
this parasite, the southern house mosquito, Culex quinque-
fasciatus, is invasive in Hawaii since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (Lounibos 2002). An eradication drive 
targeting mosquito populations could protect endemic birds 
(Fig. 2a; NASEM 2016).
Potential methods include the disruption of mosquito 
genes that are required for female fertility (e.g. doublesex 
gene; Kyrou et al. 2018) or for the propagation of malaria 
parasites (e.g. a Culex gene equivalent to the FREP1 gene in 
A. gambiae; Dong et al. 2018). An alternative to eradication 
drives includes the introduction of cargo genes that code for 
antibodies preventing the reproduction and transmission of 
the parasites (Gantz et al. 2015). Note that strategies alterna-
tive to gene drives based on the sterilization of females with 
irradiation (sterile insect technique) or using the bacteria 
Wolbachia (incompatible insect technique) are currently 
being developed in different mosquito species (Lees et al. 
2015; Ritchie et al. 2018).
Spreading Rht dwarfing alleles in invasive common 
ragweed
Common ragweed (Ambrosia artemisiifolia) is an annual 
plant, native to North America and invasive in South Amer-
ica, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia (Smith et al. 2013). 
Ragweed produces different allelochemical metabolites 
and suppresses the growth of native plant species, hence 
reducing plant biodiversity (Smith et al. 2013). As ragweed 
causes important allergies in humans (Smith et al. 2013) 
and is considered as a weed in agriculture (Bassett and 
Crompton 1975), many countries and the European Union 
have launched eradication programs (Smith et al. 2013). 
However, control methods based on mechanical or herbi-
cide treatments can have a negative impact on biodiversity 
(Alberternst et al. 2016).
In a recent perspective on gene drive applications in 
agriculture, Neve (2018) suggested developing suppression 
drives targeting homologues of Reduced height (Rht) genes 
in weeds. These genes are responsible for dwarfism in culti-
vated wheat and are also found in sunflowers (Ramos et al. 
2013). Ragweed is related to sunflowers and suppression 
drives that target orthologous Rht genes could be developed 
to suppress this species. Height is an important trait for 
competition for light in ragweed (Coble et al. 1981), so that 
such a gene drive would reduce ragweed competitive ability 
(Fig. 2b). The evolution of selfing would not be an issue, 
as ragweed is an obligate outcrossing plant with separate 
sexes (Friedman and Barrett 2008). As ragweed is wind-
pollinated, the decline of its population should not affect 
pollinator communities. However, ragweed populations are 
characterized by large seed banks (Brandes and Nitzsche 
2006), which might impair the spread of suppression drives 
in this species.
Introducing MHC resistance alleles in endangered 
amphibian species
The chytrid fungus, Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, has 
emerged as a global threat for up to 50% of amphibian spe-
cies (Fisher et al. 2009). The fungus reproduces mostly asex-
ually (Fisher et al. 2009), and therefore cannot be targeted 
with a gene drive. However, resistance to B. dendrobatidis 
infection varies both within and among amphibian species 
(Fu and Waldman 2017). Major histocompatibility complex 
(MHC) peptides play an important role in the innate immune 
system of vertebrates, by presenting antigens to lympho-
cytes. A specific MHC allele has been shown to increase 
the chance of survival of infected individuals in the lowland 
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leopard frog Lithobates yavapaiensis (Savage and Zamudio 
2011).
CRISPR-cas9 genome editing is advancing in clawed 
frogs, Xenopus spp. (e.g. Aslan et al. 2017), so the devel-
opment of rescue drives using resistant MHC alleles could 
be considered for amphibian populations at risk (Fig. 2c; 
Esvelt et al. 2014). However, mounting an effective immune 
response against B. dendrobatidis might also carry immunity 
trade-offs (Fu and Waldman 2017). Although replacing an 
endogenous MHC gene by a resistant MHC allele would 
increase resistance to this fungus, it would also reduce allelic 
diversity at the MHC locus which could in turn increase 
population susceptibility to other pathogens. An alternative 
would be the insertion of a gene drive cassette with a cargo 
including a resistant MHC allele at a locus unlinked to the 
endogenous MHC locus. This strategy might preserve MHC 
variability but is likely to affect the stability of the gene drive 
cassette due to the risks of recombination with the endog-
enous MHC locus.
Table 2  Potential target invasive populations for eradication, suppression and rescue drives
Type of drive Taxon Species Continent/country References
Eradication or 
suppression
Plants Spotted knapweed (Centaurea macu-
losa)
America, USA NASEM (2016)
Palmer amaranth (Amaranthus 
palmeri)
America, USA NASEM (2016)
Scotch broom (Cytisus scoparius) America, USA Gould (2008)
Yellow star-thistle (Centaurea solsti-
tialis)
America, USA This study
Common ragweed (Ambrosia arte-
misiifolia)
Europe, Africa, Asia This study (gene target proposed in 
Neve 2018)
Insects Southern house mosquito (Culex 
quinquefasciatus)
Oceania, USA NASEM (2016)
Vespine wasps (Vespula vulgaris, V. 
germanica)
Oceania, New Zealand Dearden et al. (2018)
Tunicates Sea vase (Ciona intestinalis) Oceania This study (technology presented in 
Gandhi et al. 2017)
Birds European starling (Sturnus vulgaris) Oceania, Australia Moro et al. (2018)
Reptiles Brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis) Oceania, Guam Piaggio et al. (2017)
Mammals House mouse (Mus musculus) Oceania, Australia NASEM (2016), Moro et al. (2018)
European red fox (Vulpes vulpes) Oceania, Australia Moro et al. (2018)
Feral cat (Felis catus) Oceania, Australia Moro et al. (2018)
European rabbit (Oryctolagus cunicu-
lus)
Oceania, Australia Moro et al. (2018)
Black rat (Rattus rattus) Oceania, Australia/New Zealand Moro et al. (2018), Dearden et al. 
(2018)
Norwegian rat (Rattus norvegicus) Oceania, New Zealand Dearden et al. (2018)
Stoat (Mustela ermine) Oceania, New Zealand Dearden et al. (2018)
Brushtailed possum (Trichosurus 
vulpecula)
Oceania, New Zealand Dearden et al. (2018)
Amphibians Cane toad (Rhinella marina) Oceania, Australia Moro et al. (2018)
Fish Sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) America, USA Thresher et al. (2014)
Catfish (Ictalurus punctatus) America, USA Thresher et al. (2014)
Common carp (Cyprinus carpio) America, USA; Oceania, Australia Thresher et al. (2014); AAS (2017)
Rescue Plants Eastern white pine (Pinus strobus) America, USA This study
American chestnut (Castanea den-
tata)
America, USA This study
Amphibians Lowland leopard frog (Lithobates 
yavapaiensis)
America, USA This study (concept in Esvelt et al. 
2014)
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Issues associated with a lack of efficacy 
of gene drives
Evolution of resistance to gene drives
Resistance to gene drive can either occur at the molecular 
level when a chromosome is not recognized or cleaved by the 
Cas9 enzyme (Box 1c) or at the behavioral level when wild-
type individuals avoid mating with gene drive individuals. 
To our knowledge, resistance studies have generally focused 
on molecular resistance, and behavioral resistance has never 
been investigated experimentally or theoretically. Molecular 
resistance can occur either through standing genetic varia-
tion (i.e. polymorphism at the target site) or through evolu-
tion by de novo mutations (Unckless et al. 2017).
Alleles that confer resistance to a gene drive through 
standing genetic variation are already present and segre-
gate in the target population (Drury et al. 2017). Such 
resistance alleles could originate from mutations in the 
past, or be acquired through hybridization and introgres-
sion with a related drive-resistant species (as observed 
for anticoagulant resistance in house mouse; Song et al. 
2011). Such resistance may not be a problem for rescue 
drives: alleles resistant to cleavage are expected to be more 
deleterious than the drive allele, and would therefore not 
prevent the spread of a drive-propagated beneficial muta-
tion. For suppression and eradication drives, the risk of 
resistance via standing genetic variation can be reduced by 
targeting sequences that are functionally constrained and 
hence present low polymorphisms in natural populations 
(e.g. Kyrou et al. 2018). This would, however, increase 
the risks of gene drive propagation to non-target species 
(see below).
The evolution of de novo resistance represents an 
important risk, especially for eradication and suppression 
drives. When the Cas9-induced double-strand DNA breaks 
are not repaired by gene conversion, non-homologous end-
joining (NHEJ) repair can result in insertions or deletions 
that make wild-type chromosomes resistant to further 
cleavage by the Cas9 endonuclease (Box 1c). A recent 
study in D. melanogaster shows that the probability of 
occurrence of such indel mutations in the germline could 
be several orders of magnitude higher in drive/wild-type 
heterozygotes compared to wild-type homozygotes (e.g. 
20% vs.  10−8%; Sharp and Agrawal 2016; Champer et al. 
2017). In addition, genetic variation in the NHEJ repair 
system both among and within target populations could 
select for increased resistance to gene drives (Champer 
et al. 2017, 2018b). Indel mutations conferring resistance 
are selected for when their fitness costs are lower than the 
fitness costs associated with gene drive alleles (Unckless 
et al. 2017). Studies suggest that, in plants, NHEJ repair 
predominates over homology directed repair (Gorbunova 
and Levy 1999; Li et al. 2013). The high occurrence of 
such indel mutations in target species where NHEJ pre-
dominates would impair the spread of suppression or 
eradication drives.
The emergence of resistance within a few generations 
is currently one of the main causes of failure in gene drive 
experimental evolution studies (Hammond et al. 2017; 
KaramiNejadRanjbar et al. 2018). Using several gRNAs 
that target multiple sites is predicted to decrease the rate of 
emergence of resistance alleles (Noble et al. 2017b). This 
strategy is similar to multi-drug therapy, whereby targeting 
multiple sites makes the evolution of resistance simultane-
ously at all sites less likely (Rex Consortium 2013). Two 
experimental studies found that targeting multiple sites 
decreases the appearance of alleles resistant to cleavage 
(Champer et al. 2018a; Oberhofer et al. 2018). However, 
the constructions differed and Oberhofer et  al. (2018) 
found many instances of incomplete homology-directed 
repair where the CRISPR-cas9 cassette was only partially 
copied (e.g. without the cas9 gene). Individuals carrying 
partial copies of the cassette incur important fitness costs, 
which can prevent the spread of such gene drive constructs 
(Oberhofer et al. 2018).
Cas9 activity outside of the germline/zygote
As described above, there is an optimal timing for gene con-
version (Fig. 3). When repaired by NHEJ events, cleavage 
of the wild-type allele outside of the optimal timing window 
could result in mosaic heterozygous individuals with low 
fitness. This issue has been studied only for suppression or 
eradication drives (Champer et al. 2018a; Oberhofer et al. 
2018), but not for rescue drives.
Risks of unintended effects
Using gene drive in conservation biology could result in 
potential hazards at different scales, from molecular to eco-
system levels. Most of the molecular and ecosystem risks 
associated with population management using eradication 
and suppression drives are not specific to conservation and 
can also be expected in applications for human health and 
agriculture.
Molecular off‑target mutations
To our knowledge, all gene drive experimental studies so 
far have focused on conversion at the target site, without 
testing for potential off-target effects outside of the targeted 
genomic region. In both heterozygous (wild-type/drive) or 
homozygous (drive/drive) individuals, the presence of the 
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Cas9 endonuclease could induce double-strand breaks in 
genomic regions different from the target site. A random 
mutation in the gRNA could lead to the cleavage of off-tar-
get sites (i.e. gRNA “retargeting”; Scharenberg et al. 2016). 
A drive construct can therefore be considered as a mutagen, 
whose off-target effects will depend on the specificity of 
the gRNA and on its susceptibility to retargeting mutations.
Off-target double-strand breaks could be repaired by 
homology directed repair (Box 1b) or NHEJ (Box 1c). NHEJ 
repair could result in indel mutations with potential fitness 
costs (Barton and Zeng 2018). Homology-directed repair 
could result in the replacement of the chromosomal regions 
surrounding the off-target regions by corresponding regions 
in the homologous chromosomes, leading to a local loss of 
heterozygosity (Gorter de Vries et al. 2018). Furthermore, 
near-target mutations can also occur following the resection 
of DNA double-strand breaks and homology-directed repair 
of regions flanking the target site (Cho et al. 1998), which 
also results in loss of heterozygosity (Fig. 5). For example, 
frequent loss of heterozygosity over entire chromosome 
arms has been evidenced in yeast (ranging from 10 to 40% 
per meiosis; Gorter de Vries et al. 2018). If near- and off-
target effects are frequent, they could globally increase the 
mutation load in target populations. They would represent 
an important risk of failure for rescue drives as beneficial 
effects could be overwhelmed by an increased inbreeding 
depression. In contrast, near- and off-target effects could 
accelerate population decline for eradication or suppres-
sion drives. Further studies are needed to determine the 
extent of these mutations and to model their impact on drive 
dynamics.
Propagation to non‑target populations
Several strategies could limit the spread of a gene drive 
from targeted populations to non-target populations. First, 
so-called “precision drives” (Esvelt et al. 2014) would tar-
get a gene or a sequence specific to a target population. 
A second strategy consists in first recoding an allele by 
propagating a gene drive with no fitness effect, and then 
releasing a second drive that would target the recoded 
allele only, and so forth with several successive drives 
(Esvelt et al. 2014). This approach would then limit the 
probability of spread of suppression and eradication drives 
to non-target populations. For rescue drives however, indi-
viduals carrying the final drive are selectively favored and 
(a) gene drive cassette centromere
Gene drive chromosome
Wild-type chromosome
(c)
Gene drive chromosome
Gene drive chromosome
recognition site
Cas9-induced cleavage
homology-directed repair
resection of DNA ends
homozygous deleterious mutationheterozygous deleterious mutation
(b)
Gene drive chromosome
Wild-type chromosome
Fig. 5  Risks of an extensive loss of heterozygosity. a Gene drive and 
wild-type chromosomes carry many different deleterious mutations, 
most of which are heterozygous. b Cleavage of the wild-type chro-
mosome by the Cas9 and trimming (resection) of the DNA ends by 
the double-strand break DNA repair machinery. c Many deleterious 
mutations become homozygous following homology-directed repair, 
which can increase inbreeding depression. Red vertical rectangles 
indicate deleterious mutations. The sizes of the centromere, the target 
site, the cassette and the Cas9 protein are not to scale. (Color figure 
online)
682 Conservation Genetics (2019) 20:671–690
1 3
could thus hybridize with non-target populations. Imple-
menting this strategy would take a very long time, as each 
intermediate gene drive would need several generations 
to fix. To our knowledge, no theoretical model has inves-
tigated whether such precision drives could fail due to 
resistance through adaptive introgression with non-target 
populations (see above).
Propagation to non-target populations could also be 
avoided by the use of self-limiting drives, such as drives 
that only spread, at least theoretically, if introduced above 
a given frequency (e.g. a drive with the parameters of the 
red curve in Fig. 3, underdominance systems, or a combina-
tion of gene drive and underdominance systems; Dhole et al. 
2018a). A strategy called “daisy-chain drive” (Noble et al. 
2016) has been proposed to achieve self-limitation. This 
method involves a linear chain of unlinked genetic elements, 
such that gene conversion at locus i + 1 can only occur if a 
drive allele is present at locus i. Each of the lower elements 
confers some fitness cost, so that they are all sequentially lost 
from the population (Noble et al. 2016). So far, no labora-
tory report using daisy-chain drives has been published, but 
proof-of-concept experiments using nematodes have been 
proposed (Min et al. 2017). While temporally self-limited, 
daisy drives are not spatially self-limited, as they can easily 
spread to non-target populations (Dhole et al. 2018b).
Propagation to non-target populations is a key concern 
for the use of gene drive on islands. Islands are the primary 
biogeographical systems in which gene drives might be 
developed for conservation (e.g. 80% of the world’s islands 
now have invasive rodents; NASEM 2016). Dispersal may 
be rare, but a drive can spread with just one introduced indi-
vidual. In addition, the deliberate unauthorized transport of 
gene drive individuals to non-target populations represents 
an important risk (Esvelt and Gemmell 2017). Eradication 
drives planned to be released to control invasive black rats 
and house mice in New Zealand could spread to the native 
range of these species (Leitschuh et al. 2018). Large-scale 
population genetics studies to estimate gene flow between 
New Zealand and other countries could help better estimate 
the risks of gene drive individuals escaping to other coun-
tries, and the risk of reinvasion of New Zealand following 
eradication.
The propagation of a transgene to non-target popula-
tions has been reported in genetically modified plants. For 
example, the dispersal of a transgene up to 3.8 km away 
from a test site has been observed following a field trial of 
glyphosate-resistant bentgrass in the USA (Reichman et al. 
2006). The risks of transfer of a gene drive to non-target 
populations could be estimated using population genomic 
approaches, for instance by testing for potential gene flow 
between target and non-target populations and for the pres-
ence of the target sequence and flanking sequences of the 
gene drive cassette.
Propagation to non‑target species
In addition to hybridization, DNA can be naturally trans-
ferred from one species to another through horizontal gene 
transfer. Such transfers are rarely detected, as most newly 
inserted DNA sequences are likely to be lost by genetic drift 
unless they confer strong fitness advantages (e.g. adaptive 
introgression of genes responsible for carotenoid biosynthe-
sis in pea aphids; Moran and Jarvik 2010), or have a trans-
mission advantage (self-replicating genetic elements).
Horizontal gene transfers can occur via parasites, 
pathogens or endosymbionts (e.g. viruses, bacteria, fungi 
and either sap-sucking insects in plants; Cho et al. 1998; 
or parasitoids in animals; Gilbert et al. 2010, 2014) and 
between extremely distantly related species (e.g. the BovB 
element moved at least 11 times between snakes, lizards, 
ruminants and marsupials; Ivancevic et al. 2017; and the 
Steamer element was transferred from molluscs to fish; 
Metzger et  al. 2018). A natural transposable element, 
the P-element, has invaded D. melanogaster populations 
worldwide within 50 years, most likely following a single 
horizontal gene transfer event from an unrelated species, 
D. willistoni (Clark and Kidwell 1997). The P-element 
is now spreading in D. simulans populations (Hill et al. 
2016). The transfer event might have occurred through 
hybridization of D. simulans with D. melanogaster (as 
some crosses between the two species can produce fertile 
hybrids; Davis et al. 1996), or horizontally (Kofler et al. 
2015), or even maybe artificially (unintended escape of a 
few laboratory-raised D. simulans flies genetically engi-
neered to carry a P-element), though the latter point is 
speculative.
Naturally occurring selfish endonuclease elements (so-
called homing endonuclease genes; see Glossary) are in 
essence similar to gene drive constructs. The enzyme rec-
ognizes and cuts a specific target site on the homologous 
chromosome. Homology-directed repair converts the wild-
type sequence into the homing endonuclease gene. Transfers 
of naturally occurring homing endonuclease genes have been 
documented between closely-related species (most likely 
through hybridization) and between distantly-related spe-
cies (horizontal gene transfers). For example, the omega 
element has been transferred among different yeast species 
at least 15 independent times (Goddard and Burt 1999). 
Phylogenetic analyses in plants indicate that a class I intron 
homing endonuclease gene, that specifically targets the cox1 
mitochondrial gene, has been transferred independently 70 
times between 162 taxa belonging to 45 different families 
(Sanchez-Puerta et al. 2008). This element is also present 
in the genome of several species of fungi, green algae and 
liverworts, which suggests extensive horizontal gene trans-
fers (Cho et al. 1998). However, this view may be biased as 
endonucleases that are easier to characterize are those that 
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cut conserved sites that are shared among distantly related 
species, and hence more likely to be horizontally transferred. 
Whether the spread of gene drive cassettes in non-target spe-
cies directly compares to the non-Mendelian propagation of 
natural endonuclease genes remains to be determined.
A target population fixed for an eradication drive will go 
extinct. For suppression or rescue drives that are fixed in a 
target population, there is no selective pressure to maintain 
a functional endonuclease, so that the CRISPR-cas9 cassette 
can eventually accumulate mutations (e.g. stop codons). 
These mutations have normal Mendelian inheritance 
(Fig. 1a) and can spread in target populations either through 
genetic drift (if they are neutral) or through natural selection 
(if they are beneficial, e.g. if the constitutive expression of 
Cas9 is costly). The risk of propagation to non-target spe-
cies depends on the relative frequency of functional and 
non-functional gene drive cassettes and on the time before 
the non-functional CRISPR-cas9 cassette reaches fixation. 
The persistence time of gene drives is currently unknown. 
Whether it is the same order of magnitude as chemicals used 
for population management (several decades for many per-
sistent organic pollutants such as DDT; Jones and De Voogt 
1999) remains to be investigated.
Consequences for ecosystems
Removing invasive species might have unanticipated neg-
ative impacts on ecosystems through indirect effects on 
food webs (Zavaleta et al. 2001). Eradicating an invasive 
population might lead to the subsequent reinvasion by the 
same species or a different species with the same ecologi-
cal niche. Other potential indirect effects depend on the 
position of the invasive species in the food chain. Invasive 
prey species can be heavily consumed by predators so that 
their sudden removal might result in increased predation 
on endemic species (Courchamp et al. 2003). For example, 
poisoning of black rats in a New Zealand forest resulted 
in invasive stoats (Mustela erminea), one of the main rat 
predators, switching their diet to native birds and bird eggs 
(Murphy and Bradfield 1992). Conversely, removing an 
invasive predator or an invasive herbivore might cascade 
down the food chain. For example, the eradication of feral 
goats and pigs on Sarigan islands (a US territory in the 
northwestern Pacific) led to the release of a previously 
undetected invasive vine (Operculina ventricosa) that sub-
sequently covered most of the native forest and surround-
ing grassland (Kessler 2002). When two invasive species 
compete for the same niche (e.g. rats and mice), targeting 
only one competing species can result in an increase of the 
population of the other (Caut et al. 2007). Invasive spe-
cies can also create new habitats or provide a food source 
for native species. For example, the worldwide invasion 
of the American brine shrimp Artemia franciscana has 
led to the extinction of many native Artemia parthenoge-
netica populations in Southern France (Rode et al. 2013). 
Contrary to A. parthenogenetica, A. franciscana is present 
throughout the winter in the area and represents a food 
source for native birds, including the greater flamingo 
(Phoenicopterus roseus). Eradicating the invasive A. fran-
ciscana might negatively affect native bird communities. 
More generally, eradicating an invasive species can move 
the ecosystem further away from its equilibrium without 
returning to its pre-invasion state, sometimes even mak-
ing the system more susceptible to new invasions (David 
et al. 2017).
All of the risks listed above are not specific to popula-
tion management using gene drives. As the pace of popula-
tion suppression or eradication is likely to differ between 
gene drives and other control strategies, theoretical mod-
els could help anticipate and mitigate potential negative 
effects (David et al. 2013). For instance, the release of 
gene drive individuals might transiently increase popula-
tion size with potentially long-lasting ecological conse-
quences (David et al. 2013). Finally, rescue drives could 
destabilize food webs, for example by turning an endan-
gered species into an invasive one.
Risk of failure of countermeasures to stop 
an ongoing drive
The reversibility (or not) of the modification is a key issue 
for the genetic modification of wild organisms. A first 
straightforward method to stop an ongoing gene drive is to 
release drive-resistant individuals that carry a functional 
copy of the targeted gene without the recognition sequence 
(Box 1c; Vella et al. 2017). This approach is expected to be 
effective for eradication drives, which impose strong fitness 
costs, but not for rescue drives or suppression drives impos-
ing mild fitness costs (see above).
A second method consists in stopping the spread of a 
gene drive using a so-called gene drive brake (hereafter 
“brake”; Wu et al. 2016). Depending on whether the brake 
allele includes the cas9 gene, one can distinguish “immuniz-
ing reversal drives” and “reversal drives”. The former are 
used to replace both the initial drive and wild-type alleles 
with a second drive immune to the initial drive (Esvelt et al. 
2014). Immunizing drives include the cas9 gene and have 
two different gRNAs that target the wild-type sequence and 
the sequence of the initial gene drive (Esvelt et al. 2014). 
The latter do not possess the cas9 gene and only target the 
sequence of the initial gene drive (Gantz and Bier 2016; Wu 
et al. 2016). In gene drive/brake heterozygotes, the gRNA 
binds with Cas9 to disrupt the functional copy of the cas9 
gene (Fig. 6). In wild-type/brake heterozygotes, the brake 
has a regular Mendelian inheritance. A laboratory experi-
ment in D. melanogaster showed that a reversal brake can 
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inactivate a gene drive with a high efficiency (> 90%; Wu 
et al. 2016). Both immunizing reversal drives and reversal 
drives can in theory include a functional copy of the gene(s) 
disrupted by a prior suppression or an eradication drive, and 
thus have a fitness similar to that of the wild-type allele 
(Esvelt et al. 2014).
Brakes are not a perfect cure against drives: the presence 
of a drive allele in a population during the time between 
brake release and drive elimination can have long-lasting 
effects on the recovered populations, including inbreeding 
depression due to a temporary decrease in population size 
or to the presence of off-target mutations. Moreover, coun-
termeasures against rescue drives are likely to fail, as drive 
alleles have a higher fitness than wild-type alleles.
A recent theoretical study shows that the release of brake-
carrying individuals can lead to the fixation of the brake 
allele, the restoration of the wild-type allele or oscillations 
around a polymorphic equilibrium where both wild-type, 
gene drive and brake alleles are maintained through time 
(Vella et al. 2017). The polymorphic equilibrium is observed 
when the brake allele has a lower fitness than the wild-type 
allele. Overall, immunizing reversal drives are better at 
stopping an ongoing gene drive than reversal drives, as they 
target both the wild-type and drive alleles (Vella et al. 2017). 
However, once the drive is eliminated, the population still 
contains a copy of the cas9 gene and the continued presence 
of the Cas9 protein can increase the risks of potential nega-
tive off-target mutations (Gantz and Bier 2016; see above). 
Populations fixed for a reversal drive are also genetically 
modified, as they express the gRNA directed against the 
cas9 gene, but they do not carry a cas9 gene. Finally, the 
probability of stochastic elimination of an ongoing gene 
drive decreases with the cost of the brake allele (Vella et al. 
2017). Calvez et al. (2018) studied the spatial spread of both 
drive and brake alleles. The brake allele can catch up with 
the drive allele and remove it from the population if the fit-
ness reduction due to the drive allele is strong enough. When 
a drive has milder negative effects on fitness, it cannot be 
stopped and keeps spreading spatially.
Guidelines for gene drive usage 
in conservation
Informed decision‑making
Due to their potential low costs and large scale of action 
compared to other biocontrol methods, gene drives have 
been considered by some authors as multi-purpose silver 
bullets in conservation biology, agriculture and public 
health (Esvelt et al. 2014). Because their implementation 
could have far-reaching unintended consequences and trig-
ger irremediable modification of the natural environment, 
other authors (e.g. Webber et al. 2015) pointed that gene 
drives also pose strong conservation threats. The long his-
tory of successes and failures in classical biological con-
trol can help making several recommendations for gene 
drive research. In the USA, the National Academies have 
issued guidelines for gene drive research (NASEM 2016). 
At the international level, decision 14/19 of the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; https ://
www.cbd.int/doc/decis ions/cop-14/cop-14-dec-19-en.pdf) 
highlights the need of a case-by-case risk assessment to 
minimize potential adverse effects and the importance of 
obtaining the informed consent of local communities that 
could be impacted. The assessment of biodiversity conser-
vation and synthetic biology under International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) resolution 6.086 (https ://
porta ls.iucn.org/libra ry/node/46503 ) should also be pub-
lished soon after the publication of this article (http://
www.iucn.org/synbi o).
Whether gene drives should be added to the conserva-
tion toolkit to protect endangered species or ecosystems 
depends on their added value relative to alternative strate-
gies. The field of synthetic biology is moving fast and con-
servation geneticists might be unaware of the most recent 
Brake allele
guide RNA targeting the cas9 gene
Cas9-induced
double strand break
Homology-directed repair
(a)
(b)
(c)
two brake alleles
guide RNA cargocas9
Gene drive allele
Fig. 6  Transformation of a chromosome carrying a CRISPR-cas9 
cassette into a chromosome carrying a reversal brake. a The rever-
sal brake includes a gRNA recognizing a sequence of the cas9 gene 
on the gene drive cassette. b The Cas9 endonuclease produced by the 
gene drive allele can bind to the gRNA produced by the brake allele 
to recognize and cleave the cas9 gene. c The double-strand break is 
repaired by homology-directed repair using the brake chromosome as 
a template, resulting in the conversion of the gene drive allele into a 
brake allele
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alternative strategies (Phelps et al. 2019), or of strategies 
that are becoming less cost-prohibitive (Kandul et  al. 
2019). Previous experience with failed classical biocontrol 
strategies can also provide valuable information regarding 
the relevance of using gene drives as a last resort solution. 
Gould (2008), the NASEM (2016) and Moro et al. (2018) 
provide comprehensive recommendations to fill existing 
knowledge gaps and reduce the risks of implementing gene 
drives.
Overall, three types of information about the target and 
non-target species are required before implementing a 
gene drive strategy:
– Genetic and technical information needed includes 
how to breed and conduct controlled experiments in 
the target species. Gene drive research also requires the 
availability of genome editing technology in the focal 
species or a related species, and the availability of an 
annotated reference genome to identify potential targets 
and design gRNAs that are specific of these loci (Moro 
et al. 2018).
– Ecological information needed includes behavioral and 
demographic data (e.g. spatio-temporal variation in size; 
Moro et al. 2018), and a good understanding of the mat-
ing system and of gene flow between populations (e.g. 
quantifying dispersal ability as well as anthropogenic dis-
persal; Webber et al. 2015). Spatially explicit theoretical 
models can help predict gene drive dynamics.
– Ecological and evolutionary data on potential non-target 
species includes quantification of gene flow between tar-
get and non-target species (hybridization or horizontal 
gene transfer), checking for the presence of potential tar-
get sites in non-target species, and appropriate modeling 
of food web structure to forecast long-term ecosystem 
impacts (Moro et al. 2018).
Biosafety and gene drive research
The unintentional release of gene drive individuals in the 
environment can represent an important risk for the safety 
of humans and their environment. Best practice guidelines 
have been proposed by various groups of experts (NASEM 
2016; Lunshof and Birnbaum 2017; Krishnan and Gillum 
2017; van der Vlugt et al. 2018). Gene drive strains should 
be managed using an appropriate combination of confine-
ment strategies to mitigate these risks (Akbari et al. 2015):
– Ecological confinement, by conducting gene drive 
research in countries where the target species is not pre-
sent and cannot establish in the wild;
– Physical containment, by using physical barriers (e.g. 
nets, secured lab facilities, etc.) or animal anesthesia;
– Reproductive confinement, by using lab strains that can-
not reproduce with wild individuals (e.g. Drosophila 
strain with chromosomal rearrangements; Akbari et al. 
2015);
– Molecular confinement, by using split gene drives with 
cas9 gene and gRNA on different chromosomes, or gene 
drive targeting an artificial sequence (DiCarlo et al. 2015; 
Champer et al. 2019);
– Molecular identification, by tagging gene drive strains 
with specific phenotypic markers with dominant expres-
sion (Benedict et al. 2018).
There are currently no guidelines for the transport of gene 
drive strains, and some researchers have suggested that they 
should not be distributed to other laboratories (Akbari et al. 
2015). For split gene drives, strains carrying the gRNA 
could be kept and distributed separately from the strains 
carrying the cas9 gene. The safety of gene drive research 
projects should be assessed by independent experts (e.g. 
institutional biosafety committees; Benedict et al. 2018). 
Funding agencies should ensure that appropriate guide-
lines are followed and enforced when necessary. Finally, we 
believe that a broad national and international consensus is 
required before carrying on deliberate release in controlled 
field trials, provided the high risks of propagation to wild 
populations.
Ethical and regulatory issues
Besides identifying possible risks, regulating gene drives 
requires ethical principles considering both human social 
values and non-human environmental values (NASEM 
2016). Altering an organism or the environment poses ethi-
cal questions and can result in important risks for humans 
and ecosystems (Lunshof and Birnbaum 2017). Independent 
ethical committees are needed to help shaping the goals and 
justifications of gene drive research projects.
Scientists should be socially responsible for informing 
lawmakers and engaging with the “various publics that will 
use, be affected by, take an interest in, benefit from or be at 
risk from gene drives” (Thompson 2018). Such engagement 
is key so that stakeholders and local communities can make 
informed decisions, considering both the benefits and risks 
associated with gene drives as well as potential alternatives 
to the genetic engineering of wild populations.
Given the high risks of propagation of gene drive indi-
viduals across borders, there is a pressing need to build a 
strong international regulatory framework. As genetically 
modified organisms (hereafter GMOs) containing foreign 
pieces of DNA, gene drives are subject to GMO national and 
international regulation and their provisions. At the interna-
tional level, GMOs are regulated under the 2003 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, a supplement to the Convention on 
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Biodiversity (ratified by 167 nations with the exception of 
the United States of America and Canada; CBD 2003) and 
under two directives of the European Union on GMO leg-
islation. National agencies have also issued more specific 
recommendations for the safe use of gene drives (e.g., Ger-
many, ZKBS 2016, USA; NASEM 2016; Australia; AAS 
2017; France; HCB 2017; the Netherlands; RIVM 2018). 
However, as the technology is evolving rapidly, some of the 
international and national GMO regulatory frameworks need 
to be adapted to the specificities of gene drive organisms 
(Oye et al. 2014; van der Vlugt et al. 2018). In 2016, 160 
civil society organizations called for a global moratorium on 
the development and release of the gene drive technology 
(ETC Group 2016).
Gene drive organisms can be seen as an efficient technol-
ogy for population control but also as potential bioweapons 
(Gurwitz 2014). The recent $100-million program includ-
ing gene drive research projects (“Safe Genes program”) 
funded by the American Defense Advanced Research Pro-
grams Agency might contribute to these concerns (Reeves 
et al. 2018). The debate about a potential use of gene drive 
technology requires the transparency of gene drive research 
programs (including their funding sources and an appropri-
ate risk assessment) and a broad engagement of evolutionary 
biologists with the public (Oye et al. 2014; Meghani and 
Kuzma 2018; Kofler et al. 2018).
Conclusions
Potential applications of gene drive in conservation include 
the extirpation of invasive pest populations that threaten 
biodiversity and the introduction of beneficial mutations 
in endangered populations. We highlighted the peculiari-
ties associated with rescue drives compared to suppression 
and eradication drives. Rescue drives are likely to have dif-
ferent dynamics (e.g. no risk of resistance evolution, but 
no known countermeasure to recover the wild-type popu-
lation). Overall, evolutionary and conservation geneticists 
can help better assess environmental risks associated with 
gene drives using both experimental (primarily in the lab) 
and theoretical approaches. Conservation geneticists could 
identify candidate genes for gene drives, estimate gene flow 
between target and non-target populations or species using 
population genomics approaches, and develop custom demo-
graphic models for different drive scenarios. Finally, conser-
vation ecologists could help design appropriate gene drive 
management policies by quantifying interaction networks, 
such as food web diversity, structure and functioning. We 
believe that it is essential that conservation geneticists and 
land managers develop an expertise on gene drive technolo-
gies to engage in the current debate regarding their poten-
tial applications. This engagement should help stakeholders, 
policymakers and the local communities make informed 
decisions regarding the use and regulation of gene drives.
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